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RECENT CASE NOTES
JUDGIMENTS--RES JUDICATA-EFFECT OF FORMER JUDGMENT ON EXPRESS
CONTRACT IN ACTION ON QUASI-CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION-Plaintiff sues
in quasi-contract for services rendered. Defendant pleads former adjudi-
cation, setting up that plaintiff had sued defendant in a previous action
on an alleged express contract for the same services now sued on; and that
one of the facts found in that action was that the contract was made as
alleged; but the court entered conclusions of law on all the facts found
that nothing was due under said contract. Plaintiff's demurrer to this
plea was overruled; defendant excepted and on appeal assigns as error the
overruling of his demurrer, and the overruling of his motion for new trial
which was barred on alleged error in sustaining defendant's motion for a
directed verdict. Held, affirmed.1
It is to be seen that there are four possible situations in which the
question of the effect of a judgment on express contract upon a subsequent
suit on quasi-contract will be raised:
1. Where a party is denied recovery on contract for the reason that
both parties have fully performed.
2. Where a party is denied recovery on contract for the reason that
he has not proved a contract.
3. Where a party is denied recovery on contract for the reason that he
has not performed all the conditions precedent to performance by the other.
4. Where a party is denied recovery on contract for the reason that
the contract is unenforceable or invalid.
It is well settled in the law of quasi-contracts that though the parties
have acted under a contract or supposed contract, in numerous instances
falling under situations 2, 3, and 4 above a party has quasi-contractual
rights which the courts will enforce, though he has no strictly contractual
rights.2 And the rule is also well settled that a judgment for defendant
in a suit on an express contract for the reasons given in situations 2, 3,
and 4 will not be a bar to suit in a quasi-contractual action, nor necessarily
prevent a recovery therein.3
The language of the principal case is broad enough to be construed as
taking a contrary position on situations 3 and 4 to the last rule stated
because the court contents itself with giving as the reasons for plaintiff's
defeat in the former action that "the court found * * * that there
was nothing due under it (the contract) for a number of reasons." "A
number of reasons" can cover any of the four situations described above.
However, the court's citation of cases includes most of the cases given
above and shows the court's true meaning to be more limited than its gen-
eral language would indicate. Almost the entire reasoning of the court
is given over to a discussion of the case of Young v. Farwell,4 in which
'Johnson v. Coal Bluff Min. Co., Ind. App., 178 N. E. 452 (1931).
2 For a thorough discussion of these instances, see Woodward, Quasi Contracts,
74-282.
3 Clifton v. Menser, 88 Kan. 408, 129 Pac. 159, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 124; Fritsch
Foundry v. Goodwin Mfg. Co., 100 Mo. App. 414, 74 S. W. 136; Rossman v. Tilleny,
80 Minn. 160, 83 N. W. 42; Henrietta Nat. Bank v. Barrett, 25 S. W. 456 (Tex.);
Buddress v. Schaffer, 12 Wash. 310, 41 Pac. 43; Thayer v. Harbison, 70 Wash. 278,
126 Pac 625; Water L. & G. Co. v. City of Hutchinson, 160 Fed. 41, 19 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 219; Kirkpatric v. McElroy, 41 N. J. Eq. 539; City of Davenport v. Allen,
120 F. 172; Buckingham v. Ludlum, 37 N. J. Eq. 137.
'165 N. Y. 341, 59 N. E. 143.
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case a suit in quasi-contract was brought and plaintiff therein was de-
feated because the defendant showed that plaintiff had been defeated in
a previous action on contract because of a finding of full performance.
Thus it appears that the question presented in the principal case was
this: "What is the effect of the adjudication that a contract has been
fully performed in an action on quasi-contract for the same services orig-
inally sued on?" This cannot be answered without first deciding whether
or not a cause of action in contract is distinct from a cause of action in
quasi-contract. It appears indisputable that it is, under any of the vari-
ous definitions of cause of action. The cause of action in contract involves
rights and obligations springing from a consensual arrangement of the
parties and such arrangement must be proved to sustain such cause of
action, whereas the cause of action in quasi-contract involves rights and
obligations given and imposed by law regardless of whether or not the
parties ever expressed an assent thereto. The proof required in the latter
is different from that required in the former.5 The plaintiff in a quasi-
contractual action must show an "unjust enrichment" of the defendant,
whereas such is not an essential ingredient of the successful prosecution
of the action for breach of an express contract. A number of cases defi-
nitely hold they are distinct and separate causes of action.6
The rule of res judicata has two aspects: 1. A judgment as a bar to
another action on the same legal right; 2. Conclusiveness of a judgment on
facts or questions involved. Courts speak of the rule of res judicata but
frequently leave it in doubt as to what aspect they have in mind. Such
practice is regrettable. 1. Res judicata as a bar to a legal right is thus:
A judgment on the merits is a bar to the prosecution of a second action
between the same parties on the same cause of action and concludes the
parties to the suit and those in privity with them.7 In Kitts 'V. Wilson,8
the court held that "before the rule of former adjudication can be invoked,
it must appear that the thing demanded was the same, that the demand
was founded on the same cause of action, that it was between the same
parties, and found for one of them against the other in the same quality.
The party must not only be the same person but he must also be suing in
the same right."9 A few Indiana cases are confusing on this matter.10
The Stuck case held, "A judgment is not a bar to a second action unless
it is founded on a substantially identical cause of action * * *; and, if
the evidence in the second suit is sufficient to authorize a recovery, but
could not have produced a different result in the first suit, the first judg-
ment is no bar to recovery." Strictly speaking, a "bar to recovery" is
obviously different from a "bar to the action." One prevents a recovery
5 Water L. & G. Co. v. Hutchinson, supra; Buckingham v. LI dlum, 37 N. J. Eq.
137.
6 Clifton v. Menser, supra, n. 3; Henrietta Nat'l Bank 'a. Barrett, supra, note 3;
Frisch v. Goodwin, supra, note 3; MaZlory va. City of Olympfa, 145 Pac. 627
(Wash.); Buckingham v. Ludlum, supra, note 3.
7 Cromwell V. County of Sao, 94 U. S. 351; Buckingham v. Ludlum, supra, note
3; Jones va. Vert, 121 Ind. 142, 22 N. E. 882.
s140 Ind. 604, 39 N. E. 313.
9Indianapolis & M. Rapid Transit Co. v. Reeder, 42 Ind. A. 520. 85 N. E. 1042;
Chicago & Eastern Ill. R. R. Co. va. The State, 153 Ind. 134, at 143.
10See Kirkpatrick v. Stingley, 2 Ind. 269 (1850). and Stuck v. Town, 201 Ind. 66
(1928).
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only; the other goes further and prevents the maintenance of the action.
If by "bar to recovery" the court meant "bar to action," then it said that
a judgment in some instances might not be a bar to another suit on the
same cause of action previously adjudicated. If the court used "bar to
recovery" in its strict sense, then it said that a party could be successful
in a suit although a judgment has been previously rendered against him
on the same cause of action. This latter proposition embraces the former.
So the court must be considered as at least to have made the former state-
ment and is thus unsupported by precedent. It seems that in these cases
the courts are seeking to follow the test used by the great weight of au-
thority to determine whether causes of action are the same in the problem
of res judicata as a bar to an action and have misstated it. This test is
that stated in 2 Black, Judgments, Sec. 726: "For the purpose of ascer-
taining the identity of the causes of action, the authorities generally agree
in accepting the following test as sufficient: Would the same evidence
support and establish both the present and the former causes of action?
If so, the former recovery is a bar; if otherwise, it does not stand in the
way of a second action." Following this test, if the same evidence re-
quired to entitle the party to succeed in the second action would not have
altered the result against him in the former action, then the judgment in
the former action will not be a bar to the second action. The Indiana
Supreme Court in Bunel v. Jean,11 supports this test.
The second aspect of res judicata is as follows: The determination of
a fact or question which was actually and directly in issue in a former
action is conclusive as to that fact or question in another suit between the
same parties or their privies upon a different cause of action.12 The dis-
tinction between these two aspects of res judicata is that in the former,
the judgment may be pleaded to bar the maintenance of a second action;
whereas in the latter the judgment operates only to prevent litigation of
and concludes the parties only as to those facts in issue or points contro-
verted upon the determination of which the finding or verdict was ren-
dered.13
The principal case states there is no merit in the present action because
all the matters complained of have been duly adjudicated. This does not
show which aspect of res judicata the court intended to apply, inasmuch
as it is capable of either construction. However, it would be immaterial
in a case in which a contract has been previously held to be fully per-
formed which theory of res judicata is applied, so far as actual result is
concerned. Under either theory the plaintiff could not recover in quasi-
"1196 Ind. 187, 146 N. E. 754.
2 Cromwell v. County of Sac, supra, note 7; Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Ibs,
237 U. S. 662; Southern Pacific Co. v. United States, 168 U. S. 48-49; Forsyth v.
Hammond, 166 U. S. 518; Hanks v. Swett, 4 Hun (N. Y.) 146; Greenfield Gas Co.
v. Trees, 165 Ind. 209, 75 N. E. 2; Gutheil v. Goodrich, 160 Ind. 92, 66 N. E. 446;
Duncan v. Holcomb, 26 Ind. 378.
13 Cromwell v. County of Sac, supra, note 7, where the court said: "On principle,
a point not in litigation in an action cannot be received as conclusively settled in
any subsequent action upon a different cause because it might have been determined
In the first action. In all cases where it is sought to apply the estoppel of a judg-
ment reduced upon one cause of action to matters arising in a suit upon different
cause of action, the Inquiry must always be as to the point or question actually
litigated and determined in the first action."
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contract; under the one, because he could not maintain the action; under
the other, because the fact of full performance by defendant would pre-
vent any quasi-contractual obligation from arising since there would be
no unjust enrichment and would constitute a complete defense. In Wil-
liams v. McDonald'4 the plaintiff brought action on an express contract
for services and was defeated because the services were worthless. He
then sued in quasi contract. The court held: "This fact (worthlessness
of services), if true, was a good defense, not only to the first, but to the
second action, and its truth having been established as a finality between
the parties, the judgment so establishing it is a bar to the second action,
or possibly putting it more accurately, although the difference here is im-
material, is a final and conclusive defense to the second action." It would
seem that the effect of the prior adjudication in the principal case would
be governed by the second aspect of res judicata, so as to establish a com-
plete defense. It is submitted that strictly speaking a judgment on the
legal rights arising out of an express contract is never a bar to an action
in quasi-contract. Clifton v. Menser, supra, held: "The same petition
may include, in separate counts, a claim based on an express contract to
pay an agreed sum for services, and one based on an implied contract to
pay their reasonable value. Each count states a complete cause of action.
Proof in support of one is not admissible under the allegations of the
other. The causes of action are not the same. They are distinct and
different, although not wholly independent, being connected by this tie;
there may not be a separate recovery on each. It follows that a plaintiff
who sues on an express contract, without adding a count upon a quantum
meruit, waives nothing, and, if defeated, is not thereby barred from main-
taining a subsequent action upon an agreement arising by implication of
law."1 5 It is apparent that this remains true when the "same evidence"
test stated by Black is applied. In the suit on express contract plaintiff
would have to introduce evidence proving a valid contract and perform-
ance by himself of all conditions precedent to the defendant's duty of im-
mediate performance; and the contract price would be controlling, regard-
less of the reasonable value of the plaintiff's services. In the suit on
quasi-contract plaintiff must prove the facts of unjust enrichment which
gave rise to a promise implied in law to pay the reasonable value thereof.
The evidence required to justify a recovery in quasi-contract is not the
same evidence which would justify a recovery in express contract.
Thus far the rule of res judicata as a bar has been discussed from an
orthodox viewpoint. There are indications that a new rule may supplant
this rule. According to the orthodox rule it is only an action on the same
cause of action previously adjudicated which is barred. A few cases have
followed the new rule which may be stated thus: The same cause of
action and any other causes of action which might have been adjudicated
are barred.16 The principal case by a dictum is opposed to this new
rule. This dictum is found in the statement, conforming to numerous
authorities, that one who sues on a contract and fails to prove that there
14182 Pac. 29 (Cal., 1919).
"To the same effect, see Buddress v. Schaffer, 41 Pac. 43; Henrietta Nat. Bank
v. Barrett, supra, note 3.
"0 6 Ind. L. Journal, 296; 30 Columbia L. Rev. 820.
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was a contract may bring another action in quasi-contract. It is quite
clear that the action on contract might have been joined with the action
in quasi contract, both being "money demands on contract."17 The two
actions fall under the general heading "assumpsit." The probabilities are
that the new rule will be generally accepted since it is conducive to less
litigation. This new rule arises from a literal application of the orthodox
rule. The old rule was that a judgment concludes the parties not only as
to matters decided but also on all matters which might have been con-
sidered and decided.18 But this rule was applied only when the second
suit was on a part of the same cause of action as the first. Where the
second cause was different from the first, the judgment was conclusive
only as to those points or questions actually litigated and determined in
the original action, not what might have been litigated and determined.19
The new rule takes the phrase "what might have been litigated" and ap-
plies it absolutely literally. Every cause of action which might have been
adjudicated is barred. Thus quoting Professor Gavit in 6 Ind. L. J. 296.
30 Col. L. Rev. 820, "If a party might have amended; 20 might have
joined;21 might have answered by setting up a counterclaim ;22 might have
fused;23 he is now barred by the new doctrine of res judicata."
The Indiana case cited, Royal Ins. Co. v. Stewart, held that the judg-
ment in a prior legal action to recover on an insurance policy as it was
written barred an equitable action to reform said policy, and is thus con-
trary to the dictum in the instant case. S. K.
SCHOOLs-RACE SEGREGATION-CONSTrrTTIONAL LAw-Appellant, a next
friend of the relatrix, began suit in the Lake County superior court for
the purpose of mandating appellees either to reinstate relatrix in a cer-
tain named high school or to transfer and admit her "as a high school
pupil in one of the accredited high schools of the * * * school city of
Gary, Indiana." At the opening of schools of Gary in September, 1927,
relatrix enrolled as a pupil of the 10B grade (second year high school)
in Virginia Street school. On that date, this school was organized to offer
the eight years of grade work and two years of high school work. Shortly
after, all tenth grade work was discontinued in this school, and relatrix,
a member of the colored race, was transferred to Emerson High School.
Shortly thereafter, a large number of white pupils "struck" at Emerson
as a protest against the transfer of colored pupils to that school. The
school officials refused to make any changes at that time, and the strikers
returned to their classes. It is charged that they were induced to return
by the promise that the colored pupils would be removed within 90 days.
Within such period, relatrix was notified by the Gary superintendent of
,7 2S6 Burns, Hawke v. Thorn, 54 Barb (N. Y.) 164.
Is Wong Sun v. United State, 293 F. 273.
12 Cromwell v. County of Sao, supra, note 7.
2'Dodson v. Southern By. Co., 137 Ga. 583, 73 S. E. 534 (1912).21Royal Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 190 Ind. 444, 129 N. M. 353 (1921).
2Holman v. Tiosevig, 136 Wash. 261, 239 Pac. 545 (1925); Bates v. Bodie, 245
U. S. 520 (1913); Fairview Chase Corp. v. Schorf, 232 N. Y. S. 530; Gust v. Ed-
wards Co., 129 Ore. 409, 274 Pac. 914 (1929).
23Hahl v. Sugo, 169 N. Y. 109, 62 N. E. 135 (1901).
